fort monroe

©

DCSINT

FM 2-100

Opposing Force
Doctrinal
Framework and
Strategy

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Contemporary OPFOR

* Manual
Development

* Doctrinal
Framework

* Strategy

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

DCSINT

FM 2-100 Guidance

* Capstone Manual for OPFOR

* Regional Power (OPFOR/State)

* Extraregional Force (U.S.)

* Disproportionate Interests

-Total War

-All Elements of Power

* Contemporary Operational Environment

-Variables Define the State
- Framework for Multiple Scenarios

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

FM 2-100 Guidance

• Representative
Composite

• Flexible

• Amorphous

• Describe the Conditions

• Scenarios Make It a
Threat

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

DCSINT

FM 2-100 Guidance

* Possible Points of Friction/Threats to the
State

- Internal

- Regional

- Extraregional

* National Security Strategy

- Doctrine

- Force Design and Investment Strategy
Focused Primarily on Regional Conflict

- Cover All Three Threats
-All Elements of Power

- Not Just the Military Piece

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Doctrinal Structure

• FM 2-100 OPFOR Doctrinal Framework and Strategy

• FM 2-100.1 OPFOR Operations

• FM 2-100.2 OPFOR Tactics

• FM 2-100.3 OPFOR: Unconventional Organizations and
Tactics

• FM 100-60 Armor- and Mechanized-Based OPFOR:
Organization Guide

• FM 100-63 Infantry-Based OPFOR: Organization Guide

• Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)

Version l.O, 1 Feb 01

Writing Team

DOCTRINE DIVISION. OTHER TRADOC

TSD DCSINT

Mr. Jim Calway
Dr. Don Madill
LTC Jon Cleaves
MAJ Blake Burslie
Mr. Rick McCall
Ms. Penny Mellies
Mrs. Pam Senterfitt
Mr. Walt Williams

Mr. Tom Redman (WEG)

COL Maxie McFarland
Mr. Greg Fontenot
Mr. Les Grau

GUIDANCE

GEN Shinseki
GEN Abrams
COL McFarland

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

FM 2-100
OPFOR Doctrinal
Framework and

Chapter Strategy

Chapter 2 Structure of the State

Chapter 3 Strategy for Total War

Chapter 4 Force Design,

Mobilization, and
Sustainment

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

"The State"

* Artificial
Country

* Composite
Model

* Representative

* Other Names

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

d>

DCSINT

OPFOR in a Broader

* Military Forces

* Paramilitary Forces

* Other Elements of
Power

-Diplomatic-Political

-Informational

-Economic

* Allied Forces

Affiliated Forces

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Critical Variables

* Nature of the * Physical

Government Environment

* Regional and
Global

Relationships

* Economics

* Demographics

* Information

* Technology

* External
Organizations

* National Will

* Military
Capabilities

Version 1.0 , 1 Feb 01

0 ^= DCSINT :

Characteristics of the

State

* Significant Geographic Area

* Growing Population and
Economy

* Regional Power

* Could Challenge U.S. Interests

* Aggressive

* Opportunity-Driven

* Global Aspirations Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

The State

Nature of the
Government

* Nondemocratic

* Regional Power

* Ruling Elite

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

The State

Regional mid Global
Relationships

• Strategic Partnerships with
-Influential Nations
-Multinational Corporations
-Transnational
Organizations

Regional Influence
Minority Enclaves

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

The State

Economics

* Not Among World's Leaders

* Dominates Its Region

* Strong Industrial Base

* Continues to Expand

* Views U.S. as Economic
Competitor

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

The State

Demographics

* Ruling Upper Class

* Growing Middle
Class

* Large Lower Class

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

The State

Information

* Tight Control

* Aware of Role of Media and
Information

* Striving to Become Information-
Based Society

* Upgrading Information Technology

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

The State

Physical Environment

* Wide Range of Topographical
Features

* Ports, Waterways, Rail Network

* Extremes of Heat and Cold

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

The State

Technology,

* Developing Industrial and Technological
Base

* Foreign Imports

* Priorities for Development or
Acquisition:

-Infrastructure, Economy, Information

-Dual-Use

-Uniquely Military

’Aggressively Seeks to Acquire High-Tech
Weapon Systems and System Upg¥*addS' IFei ’ 01

©

DCSINT

The State

External Organizations

* Humanitarian Relief
Organizations

* Multinational Corporations

* Transnational Groups

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

DCSINT

The State

National Will

* Strong Support for Political
Leadership, Government, and
Military

* National Determination and
Resolve

* Populace Willing to Accept
Hardship

Factions and Groups Challenge
State

Version 1.0, 1

Armed Forces

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

The State

Military. Capabilities

* Army Is Largest Service

* Reserves and Militia

* Capable of Combined Arms
and Joint Operations

* Regional Power Projection

* Acquisition and Logistics

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

The State

Military. Capabilities

* More Modern Than
Neighbors

* Most Powerful Instrument

* Never Hesitating

* Meet Every Threat

* Aggressive

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

Elements of
National Power

* Sources of Power

* Instruments of
Power

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

Sources of Power

* Geography

* Population

* Economy

* National Will

* National
Direction

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Instruments of Power

* Diplomatic-
Political

* Informational

* Economic

* Military

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

NATIONAL COMMAND

ftiiTunniTV

PRESIDENT

MINISTER OF
NATIONAL
SECURITY

MINISTER

OF

DEFENSE

STRATEGIC

INTEGRATION

DEPARTMENT

MINISTER OF
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

MINISTER OF
PUBLIC
INFORMATION

MINISTER OF
FINANCE AND
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

MINISTER OF
THE

INTERIOR

MINISTRY OF

MINISTRY OF

FOREIGN

PUBLIC

AFFAIRS

INFORMATION

r

r

MINISTRY OF
FINANCE AND
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

MINISTRY OF
THE

INTERIOR

MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE

GENERAL

STAFF

1

I

OTHER

MINISTRIES

SUPREME

L HIGH COMMAND !

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

National

Security

Strategy

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

National Security
• St?aV4,£®fals

- Internal

- Regional (Primary Goal)

- Global

* Total War

* All Means
Necessary

-All Instruments of Power
- Adaptive Use

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Threats, Force Design,
and Investment
Strategy

* Internal

Extraregional

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

d>

DCSINT

Views of United States

* Overall Advantage in Warfighting Capability

* Vulnerability of Coalitions

* Unwillingness to Accept Heavy Losses

* Sensitivity to Public Opinion and Lack of
Commitment

* Preference for Standoff Combat

* Lack of Optimization for Close, Dismounted
Combat

Deoendence on Hiah Technoloav

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

d>

DCSINT

Views of United States

* Dependence on Information Dominance

* Predictable Operations

* Lack of Cultural Awareness
'Vulnerability of Force Projection

* Dependence on Robust Logistics

* Reliance on Contractor Support

* Downsizing After Conflict

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

d>

DCSINT

Principles of Operation
Against Extraregional

* Deny AccesPlC&Wtf^Hon

* Control Tempo

* Cause Politically Unacceptable
Casualties

* Neutralize Technological Overmatch

* Change the Nature of Conflict

* Allow No Sanctuary

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

Strategic

Campaign

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Strategic Campaign

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
Against Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity

REGIONAL

TRANSITION

ADAPTIVE

OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS

Against

A

Against

Regional

/ \

Extraregional

Opponents

/ \

Opponents

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Strategic Operations

* Occur Throughout the Strategic
Campaign

* Not Limited to Wartime

* Can Transcend Region

* Target Enemy's Strategic Centers of
Gravity

- Soldiers' and Leaders' Confidence

- Political and Diplomatic Decisions

- Public Opinion

- Interests of Private Institutions

- National Will
-Alliances and Coalitions

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Strategic Operations

* Deter or Compel Regional Actors

* Defensive During Regional
Operations

* Prevent Outside Intervention

* More Aggressive After
Intervention

* Get Extraregional Force to Leave

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

S tratregicAQpera t i o n s

- Diplomatic Initiatives

- Information Warfare

- Economic Pressure

- Terrorist Attacks

- State-Sponsored
Insurgency

- Direct Action by SPF

- Deep-Strike Precision
Fires

- WMD

• Place Noncombatants at
Risk

No Sanctuary

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

* State Overmatches in Conventional
Power

* Primarily Offensive

* Primary Goal to Expand Influence in
Region

* Specific Regional Goals:

-Territorial Expansion

- Economic Expansion

- Acquisition of Natural Resources

- Protection of Related Minority

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Regional Operations

* Achieve Strategic Decision or Specific
Regional Goals as Rapidly as Possible

-To Preclude Regional Alliances
-To Preclude Outside Intervention

* State Continues Strategic Operations
to Preclude Outside Intervention:

- Keep Foreign Perceptions Below
Threshold of Intervention

- Prevent International Consensus for
Intervention

* State Plans and Positions Forces for
Access-Denial Operations

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

Transition Operations

REGIONAL

(CONVENTIONAL)

OPERATIONS

TRANSITION

OPERATIONS

ADAPTIVE

(UNCONVENTIONAL)

OPERATIONS

* Pivotal Point Between Regional
and Adaptive Operations

• Transition May Go in either
Direction

State Anticipates and Plans

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

DCSINT

_ Transition Operations „

ExtraregionarForce Starts to Deploy into
Region

- Balance of Power Begins to Shift Away
from State

- State May Not Yet Be Totally
Overmatched

- State Cannot Handle This Threat with
Normal “Conventional" Patterns of
Operation

State Begins to Adapt Its Operations to
New Situation/Changing Threat

State Still Pursues Overall Strategic Goal
of Regional Expansion Version 10 ’ :

DCSINT

NeTnan$iitj ocfa«Qp«ra± i o n s

- Defeat Outside Intervention

- Prevent Full Intervention (Access-
Denial)

- Preserve State's Instruments of Power

- Seek Transition Back to Regional
Operations

Mixture of Offensive and Defensive Actions
to

- Control Tempo

- Change the Nature of the Conflict

- Buy Time for Strategic Operations to
Succeed

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Transition Operations

Possible Outcomes:

* Extraregional Force Suffers Losses or
Must Withdraw from Region:

- State's Operations May Begin to
Transition Back to Regional
Construct

-Again Becoming Primarily Offensive

* Extraregional Force Continues to Build
Up Power in Region:

- State's Transition Operations May
Begin to Gravitate Toward Adaptive
Operations

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

DCSINT

Adaptive Operations

* State Must Employ Adaptive Operations
if It Cannot

- Deny the Extraregional Force Access
into the Region

- Defeat His Forces Before Combat
Power Equals or Exceeds the State's

* Not an Entirely Separate Construct

- Adaptive Applications of Same
Construct

- State Has Already Planned How to
Adapt

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Adaptive Operations

* Primary Objectives:

- Preserve Instruments of Power

- Ensure Survival of Regime

- Degrade or Destroy Enemy's
Will and Capability to Fight

- Gain Time for Aggressive
Strategic Operations to Succeed

* Long-Term Goal Is Still Expansion

- Only Temporarily Thwarted

- Focus on Effects Over Time

- Patience Is the State's Ally

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

DCSINT

Adaptive Operations

* Disperse Forces in Areas of Sanctuary

- Physical

- Moral

* Defend in Sanctuaries When Necessary

* Use Windows of Opportunity to Attack

-Ambush and Raid

- Mass Fires from Dispersed Locations

- Rapidly Mass Forces at Time and
Place of Its Choosing

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Adaptive Operations

* Expect Commanders to

- Seize Opportunity

-Tailor Organizations to Missions

- Make Creative Use of Existing
Capabilities

Even More Than in Regional and
Transition Operations

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

Adaptive Operations

* Total War with All Means Necessary

- Creative and Adaptive Use of
Existing Technologies and Forces

- Conventional and Unconventional
Forces in Adaptive Manner

- Combination of Offense and Defense

- Close Coordination with Strategic
Operations

- Attack the Enemy Throughout His
Depth

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

Adaptive Operations

Possible Outcomes:

* Completely Resolve Conflict in State's
Favor

* At Least Allow Return to Regional
Operations

* Stalemate May Be Victory for State

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

State Achieves Strategic Goals

DCSINT

Strategic Campaign Plan

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

Against Opponents' Strategic Centers of Gravity

Opponents Against Extraregional

Opponents

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

State Achieves Strategic Goals

d>

DCSINT

Strategic Campaign Plan

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

^ Against Opponents' Strategic Centers of Gravity

(1H

REGIONAL
OPERATIONS

REGIONAL 0r f
OPERATIONS A.

. £.V

REGIONAL

30

ADAPTIVE

OPERATIONS

OPERATION

i

i

Against Regional
Opponents

Against Extraregional
Opponents

QD State achieves its strategic goals without combat, through
strategic operations that compel other actors to yield to
State's will.

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

Strategic Campaign Plan

U)

g STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

<3 Against Opponents' Strategic Centers of Gravity

~ REGIONAL an j

® OPERATIONS d y©

+j REGIONAL °Y

„ OPERATIONS A

<D

.2 REGIONAL

■5 OPERATIONS

i-f -

ADAPTIVE^

OPERATION^/

(U

Against Regional
+5 Opponents

Against E:

xtraregional

Opponents

(2) State must react to a particular regional threat or seizes an
opportunity to change status quo in region.

(3) While strategic operations continue, State achieves its
strategic goals through regional operations against weaker
neighbors, without extraregional intervention.

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

State Achieves Strategic Goals

DCSINT

Strategic Campaign Plan

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

Against Opponents' Strategic Centers of Gravity

REGIONAL
OPERATIONS

REGIONAL ' f (4
OPERATIONS®

® +

REGIONAL
OPERATIONS

ADAPTIVE

OPERATION

N£/

Against Regional

Opponents Against Extraregional

Opponents

@ Extraregional power threatens to intervene.

( 5 ) State deters extraregional intervention through strategic

( 6 ) operations.

State achieves its strategic goals after deterring
intervention.

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

State Achieves Strategic Goals

d>

DCSINT

Strategic Campaign Plan

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

Against Opponents' Strategic Centers of Gravity

REGIONAL
OPERATIONS

REGIONAL or f

OPERATIONS A.

J ,

REGIONAL

i(7)

j °

ADAPTIVE

OPERATIONS

OPERATION

i

i

Against Regional

Opponents Against Extraregional

Opponents

State unable to deter intervention; begins transition
operations.

State defeats early-entry forces or causes extraregional
forces to withdraw from region; transitions back to regional
operations.

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

State Achieves Strategic Goals

DCSINT

Strategic Campaign Plan

<D

©

©

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

Against Opponents' Strategic Centers of Gravity

REGIONAL
OPERATIONS

REGIONAL

OPERATIONS

REGIONAL

OPERATIONS

Against Regional

Opponents Against Extraregional

Opponents

Extraregional forces fully deployed and overmatch State
forces; State conducts adaptive operations.

Extraregional forces withdraw from region after defeat or
stalemate; State begins transition back to regional
operations.

State achieves its strategic goals after extraregional version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

o-

DCSINT

Summary

* Baseline for Contemporary OPFOR

* Total Operational Environment

* All Instruments of Power

* How to Fight and Win Against the U.S.

* Less Predictable

* Flexible, Thinking, Adaptive OPFOR

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01

©

DCSINT

Questions?

Version 1.0, 1 Feb 01